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THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

BIOTECHNOLOGY’S PRESCRIPTION FOR PATENT REFORM
CHRISTOPHER M. HOLMAN
ABSTRACT
On June 8, 2005, Congressman Lamar Smith introduced H.R. 2795, the “Patent Reform Act of
2005,” aimed at improving the quality and certainty of issued patents, simplifying the patent
procurement process, harmonizing U.S. law with international practice, and reining in abusive
patent enforcement practices. Congress has set the legislation aside for the time being, but will
likely revisit the issue again shortly. The biotechnology industry, one of the fastest growing sectors
in the United States economy, strongly opposes many of the proposed reforms. This paper considers
the Congressional testimonies of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”) and other
representatives of biotechnology’s interests, and finds that the industry’s adamant opposition to
many of the proposals is driven largely by a belief that biotechnology patents function primarily as
tools for securing investment funding, and the fear that investment in biotechnology will be
adversely impacted if investors perceive that patent reform has weakened the rights of patent
owners and inventors. The paper also considers how the biotechnology sector might be impacted if
the proposed reforms are enacted into law, and describes some recent biotechnology cases wherein
the outcome might have been different if the reforms had already been in place.
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BIOTECHNOLOGY’S PRESCRIPTION FOR PATENT REFORM
CHRISTOPHER M. HOLMAN∗
INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 2005, Texas Congressman Lamar Smith introduced H.R. 2795, with
the short title of “Patent Reform Act of 2005,” in the U.S. House of Representatives.1
If enacted, H.R. 2795 would have constituted the most substantial and
comprehensive package of patent law reforms since the Patent Act of 1952.2 The
proposed amendments not only would have changed the rules pursuant to the way
that patents are procured, enforced, and challenged, they would have fundamentally
altered the requirements for a patentable invention.3
Not surprisingly, the prospect of such sweeping reform engendered a strong
backlash from a variety of interest groups whose constituencies might be adversely
impacted by changes to the status quo,4 and for the time being H.R. 2795 appears to
have stalled.5 Nevertheless, at some point Congress will return its attention to
patent reform, and it seems likely that at least some of the provisions of the bill will
eventually become law.6
One of the groups most critical of the reform package was the biotechnology
industry.7 Biotechnology is one of the fastest growing industrial sectors in the
United States, and also one of the industries most dependent upon the availability of
strong intellectual property rights.8 This importance is reflected in the keen interest
biotechnology takes in shaping patent law and policy both in the United States and
abroad.9 In this paper, I will consider the potential impact of various aspects of
patent reform from the perspective of this important sector of the economy.

∗
Christopher M. Holman is an associate professor of law at the University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Law. This article is based on the presentation “Innovation and it Discontents: Patent
Reform and Innovation Policy in the 21st Century,” given at The John Marshall Law School’s
Howard T. Markey Patent Law Symposium on Oct. 14, 2005.
1 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
2 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
3 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795 § 3.
4 See infra Parts I and II.
5 Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O: Patent Law Blog,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/12/patent_reform_2.html (Dec. 8, 2005).
6

Id.

Letter from A. Scott Whitaker, Chief Operating Officer, Biotechnology Industry Organization,
to Lamar Smith & Howard Berman, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
available
at
Property,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(May
12,
2005),
http://www.bio.org/ip/action/20050513.pdf.
8 Biotechnology Industry Organization, Intellectual Property, http://www.bio.org/ip/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005).
7

9

Id.
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I. BACKGROUND ON H.R. 2795
The recent round of patent reform legislation was driven in large part by a
widely held belief that deficiencies in the U.S. patent system are imposing
substantial negative effects on U.S. research and development as well as the economy
at large.10 For example, in 2004 the economists Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner
published Innovation and Its Discontents,11 a book which criticizes a number of
aspects of the current system. The book stimulated much debate on the subject of
patent reform, including the conference where this paper was first presented.
Many of the concerns expressed in the book were echoed in two comprehensive
studies issued by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)12 and the National
Research Council of the National Academies (“NRC”).13 These studies identified a
host of problems with the current patent system and proposed reforms aimed at
addressing these problems.14 Many of these proposals found their way into H.R.
2795.15 In a nutshell, most of the reforms aim to improve the quality and certainty of
issued patents, simplify the patent procurement process, harmonize U.S. law with
international practice, and rein in abusive patent enforcement practices.16
With respect to patent quality, part of the problem arises from the legal
presumption that an issued U.S. patent is valid and enforceable.17 Reformers charge
that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) is issuing too many “junk”
patents, i.e., patents that do not satisfy all of the requirements of patentability, such
as novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement, but somehow slip through the filter of
patent examination anyway.18 Oftentimes, patent litigation is the only practical
avenue available to challenge the validity of an issued patent, which typically occurs
after an infringement suit has been filed, and even then the presumption of validity
raises the specter that a junk patent will nevertheless be upheld by a court in
deference to the PTO.
Many of the proposed reforms aimed at improving patent quality would do so by
allowing interested third parties more opportunity to participate in the patent
examination process and actively challenge questionable patents in the PTO, thereby
preempting patent litigation.
For example, the legislation would institute
mechanisms by which interested third parties could submit to the PTO prior art
10 Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy, Executive Summary, at 4–7 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Report].
11 ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(Princeton Univ. Press 2004).
12 FTC Report, supra note 10, ch. 5, pt. 1, at 2–4 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
13 Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads., A Patent System for the 21st Century, at 3–13
(Stephen A. Merrill, et al. eds. 2004), http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf
[hereinafter NAS Report].
14 See generally FTC Report, supra note 10; NAS REPORT, supra note 13.
15 See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
16

See id.

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 11, at 34–35; FTC REPORT, supra note 10, ch. 4, pt. 2, at 4–26;
NAS REPORT, supra note 13, at 69–77.
17
18
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references relevant to the patentability of pending patent applications, thereby
assisting the patent examiner in identifying references that the examiner might
The legislation would also expand inter partes
otherwise have missed.19
reexamination, and provide for post-grant opposition proceedings in the PTO, similar
to the practice in other jurisdictions such as Europe.20 H.R. 2795 originally included
two windows during which a granted patent could be opposed.21 A challenger would
have been able to file an opposition within the first nine months after the patent
issued (the “first window”) or within six months after suit has been actually been
threatened (the “second window”).22
There is also a proposal to require the publication of all pending patent
applications eighteen months after filing.23 Mandatory eighteen-month publication
gives the public notice of pending patent applications, and thus provides an
interested third party the opportunity to submit prior art references and take other
preemptive measures to protect its freedom to operate.
These and some other of the proposed reforms would improve the predictability
and certainty of the patent process with respect to the validity of issued patents. For
example, the legislation would eliminate or restrict some of the subjective aspects of
U.S. patent law such as the best mode requirement24 and the inequitable conduct
defense.25 Other provisions that would improve predictability and certainty include
changes that would enable the PTO to limit the excessive filing of continuation
applications,26 institute a first-inventor-to-file system,27 and revise the definition of
anticipatory prior art,28 essentially adopting a “reasonable accessibility” standard.
Some of the reforms are aimed primarily at simplifying the patenting process,
such as allowing a company or organization to file patent applications directly on
behalf of its employees.29 Under current law, employees must personally file patent
applications and then assign the application to the organization. Other changes
described above, such as changing to first-inventor-to-file and revising the definitions
of prior art, will also likely serve to simplify the patent procurement process.30
19

Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, § 10.

Id. § 9(a).
21 Id. § 9(f).
22 Id.
23 Id. § 7. Currently publication is optional for patent applicants that file only in the United
20

States. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
24 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, § 4.
25 Id. § 5.
26 Id. § 8.
27 Id. § 3.
28 Id. § 3.
29 Id. § 4.
A person to whom the inventor has assigned or is under an obligation to
assign the invention may make an application for patent. A person who otherwise
shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter may make an application for
patent on behalf of or as an agent for the inventor on proof of the pertinent facts
and a showing that such action is appropriate to preserve the rights of the parties.

Id.

Although some have pointed out that this simplification will only be realized after sufficient
case law has been developed interpreting the new definition of prior art. See, e.g.,
http://www.fr.com/news/Article-Hunsaker.pdf (last visited May 13, 2006).
30
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Some of the reforms aim to limit what many view to be abusive patent
enforcement practices. These provisions have proven particularly controversial since
the curtailment of enforcement inherently tends to weaken the property rights of
issued patents. Understandably, those that see strong patent rights as critical to
their industries, such as the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, have
voiced strong opposition to many of these proposals. One such proposal would change
the manner in which damages are apportioned in cases where infringement has been
found with respect to one component of a combination invention.31 Another would
expand the currently limited prior user’s right defense, by removing restrictions such
as the limitation of the defense to patents claiming methods of doing or conducting
business.32 It would also weaken the current strong presumption in favor of
permanent injunction once a patent has been found to be infringed.33 In addition,
some of the previously mentioned reforms relating to continuation applications,
willful infringement, and the various proposals for expanding the rights of third
parties to challenge patents in the PTO would also fall within this category of
limiting abusive patent enforcement practices.
Incidentally, many of the proposed changes would serve to harmonize the laws of
the United States with those of Europe and the rest of the world.34 In principle,
harmonization should benefit most industries since it will simplify the procurement
of corresponding patents in different jurisdictions.35 The market for most U.S.
companies is not limited to the confines of the United States, and in this regard,
biotechnology is no exception.36
Some of the proposed reforms are relatively non-controversial, particularly those
that would simplify the patent process without substantially weakening the rights of
the patent holder. These reforms include establishing a first-inventor-to-file system,
allowing assignee filing, allowing pre-grant submission of prior art, revising the
definition of prior art, and mandatory publication of applications after eighteen
months.37 Other provisions however, particularly those that would tend to restrict
the ability of inventive entities to procure and enforce patents, generated substantial
resistance from a number of constituencies, including the biotechnology sector. In
particular, the reforms relating to damage apportionment, injunctions, continuation
practice, and the establishment of opposition proceedings, especially second-window
oppositions, sparked the most resistance.38
See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, § 6.
See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, § 9.
33 See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, § 7.
31
32

34 For example, the move to first-inventor-to-file, opposition practice, and elimination of some
of the subjective elements of patentability.
35 Intellectual Property Organization, Member States Begin Talks on Shaping a Future Global
Patent System (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2000/wipo_upd_2000_114.html.
36 Biotechnology Industry Organization, Intellectual Property, http://www.bio.org/ip/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005).
37 These proposals are, at least, non-controversial with respect to many of the various corporate
interests. Small inventors and entrepreneurs tend to be opposed to many of the proposed changes
that the various industrial sectors agree are desirable, such as the move to first-inventor-to-file and
any expansion of inter partes reexamination or post-grant opposition procedures.
38 The Patent Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property Subcomm. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 109th. Cong. (2005) (statement of Gary

L. Griswold).
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In response to this organized opposition, on July 26, 2005, Congressman Smith
circulated a proposed Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795
(“Substitute”).39 The Substitute retreated from a number of the changes proposed in
the original legislation by eliminating the provisions relating to injunctive relief,
continuation practice, and second-window post-grant opposition procedures.40 The
Substitute also attenuated the damage apportionment provision relative to the
originally filed legislation.41
All of these provisions were supported by the
information technology sector,42 but strongly opposed by the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries.43
The Substitute also included for the first time a provision relating to choice of
venue in patent infringement suits.44 Essentially, the provision would require that
patents cases be brought only in the judicial district where the defendant has
committed infringement, or resides, and has a regular and established place of
business.45 In contrast with the other changes in the Substitute, the venue provision
favors the defendant in an infringement action by substantially limiting the ability of
patentees to control the choice of forum in patent litigations. The addition of the
venue provision has been seen as a concession to the information technology sector.46
Finally, a third version of the legislation, the so-called “Coalition Print,” has
been proposed.47 Because it was apparent that the divergent interests of the various
stakeholders might completely derail the move for patent reform, a coalition of
thirty-five major companies constituting an assortment of the technology sector (the
Coalition for Patent Reform) proposed an amended version of the legislation that
reflected consensus or compromise positions on many of the issues.48 The Coalition
Print, released on September 1, 2005, tracks Congressman Smith’s Substitute with a
few differences.49
For example, the Coalition Print attenuates the damage
apportionment provisions even further than the Substitute,50 but softens the choice of
39 Lamar Smith, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795 (2005),
http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/patentact2005/Patentact2005_draftamen
dsubst.pdf. Although the Substitute was never formally introduced in Congress, the draft was
widely distributed and was the subject of hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet
and Intellectual Property on Sept. 15, 2005, the last formal Congressional action on the bill.
40
41

See id.
Id. § 6.

42 The term “information technology sector” refers to the computer, software, Internet,
telecommunications, and other like industries.
43 See Kate Ackley, Information Technology Industry Council, Roll Call: Patent Pending (2005),
http://www.itic.org/archives/articles/20050525/roll_call_patent_pending.php (last visited Apr. 9,
2006).
44 Smith, supra note 39, § 9.
45 Smith, supra note 39, § 9.
46 Promote the progress, Draft amendment to the Patent Act of 2005 - Pharma's bill, with a
twist (2005), http://promotetheprogress.com/archives/2005/08/draft_amendment.html.
47 A Coalition for 21st Century Patent Law Reform, Balanced Initiatives to Advance Quality
and
Provide
Litigation
Reforms
(2005),
http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/patentact2005/Patentact2005_IPOcoalitio
nprint.pdf [hereinafter Coalition Print].
48
49

See generally id.
Id. (noting deletions and additions with strikethrough and underline formatting,

respectively).
50 Id. § 6.
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venue provision.51 Rather than necessarily letting the defendant dictate the forum,
the Coalition Print merely requires, in certain instances, the transfer of venue to a
more appropriate forum, and as such is less pro-defendant than the language in the
Substitute.52
On September 15, 2005, hearings were held before the House Subcommittee on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, at which time various interest groups
and commentators testified with respect to the three versions of H.R. 2795.53
Subsequent to that hearing, Congress has failed to take any formal action on the
legislation.54 Nevertheless, it is widely anticipated that Congress will take up the
issue again in the not too distant future, and many of the proposed reforms will
continue to be the focus of debate among the various stakeholders.55
II. BIOTECHNOLOGY’S AGENDA FOR PATENT REFORM
In order to assess the position of biotechnology on various aspects of patent
reform, I looked primarily to the Congressional testimony of Robert B. Chess,
speaking on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”), the main
lobbying group representing interests of biotechnology.56 BIO’s membership includes
more than 1,000 biotechnology companies, academic institutions, state biotechnology
centers, and related organizations throughout the United States57 “The mission of
BIO is to be the champion of biotechnology and the advocate for its member
organizations—both large and small.”58
In pursuit of this mission, BIO actively advocates on behalf of its constituency
with respect to a number of patent law issues, including gene patenting, the
patenting of cloning technology and clones, Hatch-Waxman reform, PTO
appropriations and fee diversion, and patent reform.59 It has also filed amicus briefs
in a number of intellectual property litigations of particular relevance to the
biotechnology industry.60 In fact, BIO has specifically identified intellectual property
protection as “the key factor for economic growth and advancement in the
Id. § 9.
Id.
53 The Patent Act of 2005: Hearing on a Proposed Substitute and Accompanying Redline to
H.R. 2795 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Lamar Smith, Chairman), available at
51
52

http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/houseoversight/091505/smithopen.pdf.
54
Library
of
Congress,
Search
Results–THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.02795: (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
55 Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O: Patent Law Blog,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/12/patentlyo_tidbi.html (Dec. 19, 2005).

56 Patent Law Revision: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter BIO
Statement] (statement of Robert B. Chess, speaking on behalf of BIO).
57 Id.

58 Biotechnology Industry Organization, BIO Mission Statement,
http://www.bio.org/aboutbio/mission/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
59 See Biotechnology Industry Organization, BIO Domestic, http://www.bio.org/ip/domestic/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
60 Biotechnology Industry Organization, BIO Amicus Briefs, http://www.bio.org/ip/amicus/ (last
visited Apr. 9, 2006) (providing links to ten amicus briefs).
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biotechnology sector.”61 BIO views patents as critical in providing the necessary
incentives for private sector investment into biotechnology development.62 Because
BIO represents such a wide spectrum of biotechnology companies, ranging from tiny
start-ups to biotechnology giants such as Genentech and Amgen, and in view of the
organization’s longstanding interest in intellectual property issues as they relate to
biotechnology, its congressional testimony with respect to patent reform should serve
a good indicator of the consensus biotechnology position, to the extent such a
consensus exists.63
I also reviewed the testimony of some other organizations in order to determine
how they compare to that of BIO. For example, I considered the testimony given on
behalf of Genentech, Inc.64 As a leading biotechnology company, one would expect
Genentech and its interests to be largely represented by BIO. But Genentech is a
relatively mature company, selling products and generating substantial revenue from
these sales, which distinguishes it from the typical biotechnology company. Many, if
not most, of BIO’s members are not selling products, and are often years from a
viable commercial product.65 These companies typically rely heavily on large
infusions of investment capital,66 and their interests in patent reform should be
expected to diverge somewhat from a revenue-generating company such as
Genentech. Indeed, while BIO and Genentech agree on most issues, there are a few
issues upon which they disagree, and these divergences tend to reflect the different
concerns of a mature biotechnology company as opposed to a start-up.
Biotechnology was born in university laboratories, and universities continue to
conduct much of the basic research driving biotechnology. Particularly since the
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act67 in the 1980s, universities have increasingly
assumed the role of commercial players in the biotechnology sector, and many have
profited handsomely.68 In light of this phenomenon, I also considered the testimony
of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, speaking on behalf of the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (“WARF”).69 WARF manages technology transfer for the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, and, as is the case with many universities, some of its most

61 Biotechnology Industry Organization, Intellectual Property, http://www.bio.org/ip/ (last
visited Apr. 9, 2006).
62

Id.
BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).

Of course, BIO’s diverse
membership is not a monolith, and on certain issues there is no consensus, as noted in BIO’s
congressional testimony. Id.
63

64 Patent Quality: Hearing on Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality Improvement Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Genentech Statement] (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan, speaking on

behalf of Genentech)
65
66

See BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).

Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000).
See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003).
67
68

69 The Patent Act of 2005: Hearing on Patent Reform Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter WARF Statement] (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin

Alumni Research Foundation).
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profitable technology is in the area of biotechnology.70 For example, WARF owns the
basic patents covering embryonic stem cell research.71
I also considered the testimony of Philip S. Johnson, chief patent counsel for
Johnson & Johnson, representing the Pharmaceutical Researchers and
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”).72
PhRMA represents the leading
research-based pharmaceutical companies in the United States.73 One would expect
the interests of PhRMA to be aligned with those of BIO since many of its members
are in fact biotechnology companies, or at least engage in some aspects of
biotechnology. For example, Johnson & Johnson, a major pharmaceutical company
and PhRMA member, recently acquired a number of smaller biotechnology
companies, including Scios, Therakos, and Centocor.74 Furthermore, pharmaceutical
companies and biotechnology are both primarily interested in developing and
marketing the same products, drugs, and diagnostics. Nevertheless, PhRMA
generally represents more mature companies than BIO, companies that are
generating substantial sales revenue and hence are less dependent upon investment
funding. In other words, PhRMA represents companies more like Genentech than
the more typical biotechnology start-up struggling to bring in investment capital in
the hopes of one day developing a product for the market.
Finally, for a view from the other side of the patent reform debate, I consulted
the testimony of Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel for Apple, speaking on
behalf of the Business Software Alliance (“BSA”).75 Not surprisingly, the BSA
position on a number of patent reform issues is diametrically opposed to that of BIO.
However, there are a number of reform proposals both agree on, an encouraging sign
for those hoping that at least some of the patent reform measures are eventually
enacted.
After reviewing the various congressional testimonies, it is apparent that the
proponents of biotechnology tend to be the most adamant opponents of many aspects
of patent reform. BIO opposes injunction reform, any limitations on continuation
practice, second-window opposition proceedings, and any limitation on a patent
owner’s choice of venue in bringing suit.76 In short, BIO is against virtually all of
the major proposed reforms that would weaken patents or restrict the rights of
patent holders. Still, BIO does support some reforms that could have a marginally
negative impact on the interests of inventors, including first-inventor-to-file,
70

Id.

U.S. Patents Nos. 5,843,780 and 6,200,806. See also DIANE T. DUFFY, ALMANAC OF POLICY
ISSUES, BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO STEM CELL RESEARCH (2002),
http://www.policyalmanac.org/health/archive/crs_stem_cell.shtml.
71

72 Patent Law Revision: Hearing on an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795,
the Patent Act of 2005 Before Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter PhRMA Statement] (statement of Philip S.

Johnson, speaking on behalf of PhRMA).
73 PHRMA—About PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org/about_phrma/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
74 See Johnson & Johnson, Family of Companies,
http://www.jnj.com/our_company/family_of_companies/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2006) (listing the “family
of companies” Johnson & Johnson has acquired in the center drop-down menu).

75
Patent Quality: Hearing on Patent Quality and Improvement Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)

(statement of Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple).
76 See BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
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mandatory eighteen-month publication, and pre-grant submissions of prior art by
third parties.77
Conversely, BIO supports reforms that will strengthen patent rights by making
it more difficult to challenge the validity and enforceability of issued patents during
litigation.78 In particular, BIO supports the move to eliminate the best mode
requirement and to restrict the inequitable conduct defense.79 Both of these issues
have garnered considerable criticism as “subjective” requirements of patentability
because they are based on the inventor’s state of mind.80 These issues can also be
problematic because they are generally not amenable to examination by the PTO,
and only arise during litigation. In the course of litigation, however, pre-trial
discovery can be used to uncover evidence purporting to prove that the inventor (1)
subjectively believed, but failed to disclose, that there was a best mode of practicing
the invention or (2) knew of relevant prior art, and intentionally failed to disclose it
to the PTO during examination.
Genentech’s testimony is consistent with that of BIO, though Genentech is
somewhat more open to limitations on the rights of patent owners.81 In particular,
Genentech actually supports first-window opposition proceedings, a subject with
respect to which BIO expresses no opinion.82 Conversely, Genentech expressed no
opinion on second-window opposition, to which BIO was adamantly opposed.83 The
divergence makes sense. BIO appears to be biased in favor of early stage
biotechnology companies, which generate most of their revenue from investment as
opposed to product sales.84 However, Genentech is a relatively mature biotechnology
company that generates substantial sales revenue, and as such, is much more likely
to find itself a defendant in a patent infringement action.85 Hence, the ability to
preemptively dispose of junk patents by means of post-grant opposition would be
much more appealing to Genentech than to the average biotechnology company.
The position of WARF with respect to patent reform is even more reactionary
than that of BIO. WARF agrees with BIO that there should be no second window for
post-grant opposition, no weakening of the injunction standard, and no continuation
practice reform.86 However, WARF parts with BIO on a number of issues, for
example, by opposing the change to the first-inventor-to-file system.87 This stance
likely reflects WARF’s concern that universities are generally likely to delay filing an
application, and hence WARF wants to retain the ability to prove priority of
invention by invoking the interference procedure. Also, since universities have little

BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
See BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
79 See BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
80 See infra Part IV.D.
81 See Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery Kushan).
82 See Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery Kushan); BIO Statement,
supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
83 See Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery Kushan); BIO Statement,
supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
84 See BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
85 See Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery Kushan).
86 See WARF Statement, supra note 69 (testimony of Carl Gulbrandson); BIO Statement,
supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
87 See WARF Statement, supra note 69 (testimony of Carl Gulbrandson).
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need to worry about being sued for patent infringement, they are less affected by the
uncertainty problems inherent in the patent interference system.88
For the most part, the position of PhRMA is aligned with BIO and Genentech.
PhRMA does not express an opinion regarding some of the issues important to BIO
and Genentech, such as the reform regarding the subjective elements of patent law
and restrictions on continuation practice.89 However, with respect to virtually all
issues where PhRMA, Genentech, and/or BIO express an opinion, the groups are in
agreement.90 The one significant point on which they diverge is venue reform.91
While BIO is against any reform that would limit the ability of the patentee to choose
the venue for bringing suit, PhRMA is willing to accept the modified form of venue
reform proposed in the Coalition version of the reform bill (although PhRMA does
oppose the more extreme version of venue reform that appears in the substitute
legislation).92
III. OBSERVATIONS REGARDING BIOTECHNOLOGY’S POSITION ON PATENT REFORM
Before discussing some of the implications of specific reforms on biotechnology, I
digress briefly with a few general observations regarding biotechnology’s patent
reform agenda. First, to a large extent, it is apparent that biotechnology values
patents primarily for their ability to attract investment, and thus, the perceptions of
investors with respect to patent reform play a dominant role in shaping the
biotechnology position. Second, despite the widely-expressed fear that a proliferation
of patents would have a deleterious effect on biomedical research, one sees very little
evidence of that concern coming from the industry itself. To the contrary,
biotechnology is one of the staunchest defenders of a strong patent system, and
generally evinces little enthusiasm for reforms that might address the problem of a
“patent thicket.”93

A. Focus on Investors
BIO’s testimony can be paraphrased as follows: “Investors believe that in order
for the biotechnology sector to succeed, it is critical that biotechnology firms be able
to obtain and enforce strong patents. Biotechnology companies, particularly those
that have yet to put a product on the market, must rely on substantial investment
funding in order to survive.
If there is any perception that patent reform will
See infra Part IV.B.
See PhRMA Statement, supra note 72 (testimony of Philip Johnson); BIO Statement, supra
note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess); Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery
88
89

Kushan).

90 PhRMA Statement, supra note 72 (testimony of Philip Johnson); BIO Statement, supra note
56 (testimony of Robert Chess); Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery Kushan).
91 See PhRMA Statement, supra note 72 (testimony of Philip Johnson); BIO Statement, supra
note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
92 See PhRMA Statement, supra note 72 (testimony of Philip Johnson); BIO Statement, supra
note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
93 BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
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weaken patent protection for biotechnology inventions, investors will not be as
willing to fund biotechnology, and this reluctance will adversely impact
biotechnology. Therefore, BIO opposes any reform that would create such a
perception.”94
There is little discussion in BIO’s testimony with regard to the importance of
using strong patent protection to block competitors or generate licensing royalties,
the conventional uses one normally associates with patents.95 Rather, the only
example Chess provides of a patent helping a biotechnology company was an
anecdote regarding a particular patent that caused his company’s stock to shoot up
20% on the day it issued.96
BIO testified that any aspect of patent reform that would “weaken[] the ability
of innovators to obtain and enforce patent protection” should be eliminated because
any such reform would deter investors.97 For example, with respect to injunction
reform, Chess testified that BIO was “concerned that lowering the present standard
would create uncertainty and confusion in the law, hampering our ability to attract
VC financing . . . .”98 Similarly, BIO testified that second-window post-grant
opposition would create too much uncertainty regarding the validity of issued
patents.99 “With no certainty, venture capital would leave our industry, again
threatening our ability to bring new cutting-edge products to the market.”100
In short, BIO’s testimony focused almost entirely on the importance of patents
as instruments for convincing investors to put their money into biotechnology
companies. In contrast, PhRMA and BSA characterized patents a being important
because patents provide the ability to exclude competitors from the market, which is
the more conventional understanding of patent utility.
There is some basis for BIO’s concern regarding perceptions of investors. For
example, on March 14, 2000, former President Bill Clinton and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair “issued a bland statement urging all lab[oratories] to provide
‘unencumbered access’ to raw DNA sequence information.”101 The statement
reflected no actual change in patent law or policy, but was interpreted by skittish
investors as suggesting that gene patents might be disfavored by the White House.102
As described at the time in the journal Science, “[a]lmost immediately, biotech stocks,
which were already headed downward, went into a nose dive; some companies lost as
much as 20% of their value on paper in a few hours.”103 Many of the stocks never
recovered. For example, a week later, the value of stock in genomic companies
Celera and Incyte were “still 60% below their peak immediately before the
statement.”104 “One biotech expert suggested a simple explanation: Stock buyers
See generally BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
See generally BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
96 BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
97 See BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
98 BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
99 See BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
100 BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
101 Eliot Marshall, Biotechnology: How a Bland Statement Sent Stocks Sprawling, 287 SCI.
94
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‘don’t understand what they’re investing in,’ he said, and they can be easily
Clearly, biotechnology is justified in its concern with investor
spooked.”105
perceptions, regardless of whether or not there is any rational basis for the
perceptions.
BIO’s focus on investor perception reflects the concerns of an early-stage
investor-funded biotechnology company, but as the industry matures to a point where
more biotechnology companies are actually generating sales revenue, I predict that
BIO’s views on patents will also change, becoming more like those of Genentech. In
particular, biotechnology will increasingly feel the negative effects of a strong patent
regime, as is currently being experienced most acutely by the information technology
sector. At that point, BIO’s patent agenda might begin to resemble that of other,
more established industries.
At some point, BIO’s focus on the perceptions of investors could result in a
positive feedback loop. Consider the possibility that the ideal patent regime for
biotechnology is not so very different from that of other industries: what if junk
patents and strong enforcement practices are as detrimental to biotechnology as they
are to any other business sector? If biotechnology investors continue to believe that
strong patent protection is critical to the industry, they will view any weakening of
patents rights as injurious to the industry. Also, even if biotechnology companies
conclude that patent reforms would benefit the industry, they might fear that
investors would perceive the changes as detrimental. By focusing on the ability to
attract investment capital, biotechnology would lobby to maintain the status quo,
because any long term benefits to be derived from patent reform would be
outweighed by a problem of investor perception. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, such
lobbying would confirm the perception among investors that continuing strong patent
protection is critical for biotechnology.
Perhaps at some point BIO should reconsider its focus on investor perception.
The industry might ultimately be better off with some of the proposed reforms, even
if they do weaken the rights of certain patent holders. Patent policy should not be
primarily driven by the perceptions of investors, particularly if those perceptions are
flawed or outdated.

B. Little Evidence of a Patent Thicket
Various commentators have proposed that a proliferation of patents poses a
serious threat to biotechnology research by creating a patent thicket, sometimes
referred to as a “patent anticommons.”106 The theory is especially associated with
articles published by Heller and Eisenberg in 1998, and Eisenberg and Rai in
2002.107 Proponents of the patent thicket hypothesis note that while patents
traditionally were reserved for products, there has been an increasing tendency for
biomedical researchers to patent upstream inventions, i.e., research tools and inputs
105
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Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation: The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998).
107 See id.; see also Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 297; Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
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used to conduct basic research and development, as opposed to the products of
research and development.108 This trend has been attributed to changes in the law,
such as the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, and changes in the norms of science,
such as the increasing commercialization and privatization of biomedical research.109
These commentators predict that the patenting of upstream technology will result in
a difficult-to-penetrate thicket of patent rights that will severely impede biomedical
research and development.110 The idea has found resonance with many, and its
influence is evident in a variety of critiques of the current patent system.111
If in fact a patent thicket is significantly impeding biotechnology research and
development, one might expect that organizations representing the interests of
biotechnology, such as BIO, WARF, and Genentech, would be advocating for reforms
that would address the problem. Indeed, the biotechnology industry has never been
shy about advocating for legislative action to address its concerns.112 But instead,
these groups tend to be among the most adamant defenders of the status quo and
strong patent rights. One might infer from this that a patent thicket is not in fact
substantially impeding biotechnology.
The suggestion that patents are not significantly impacting the ability of
researchers to conduct biotechnology research is consistent with the results of a
recent study prepared for the National Academy of Sciences Committee on
Intellectual Property Rights in Genomic and Protein-Related Inventions.113 Through
a survey of 1125 academic and 563 industry researchers, the authors of the study set
out to assess the impact of patents on the ability of academic and industrial
laboratories to conduct biomedical research.114 Of a random sample of 398 academics
surveyed, only 1% reported suffering a project delay of more than a month due to
patents on knowledge inputs necessary for their research.115 None of those surveyed
had stopped a project due to the existence of third party patents on research
inputs.116 In contrast, access to tangible property in the form of material transfers
was found to be much more likely to impede research.117 The study also reported
substantial commercial activity among academic respondents.118
With respect to industry researchers, the effect of patents was greater than for
academic researchers, but was still relatively modest. Out of seventeen respondents,
only two reported that they had to stop a project because of a patent, and one was a
See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 289.
See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 289–91.
110 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 295–303.
111 See, e.g., Stephen Hansen et al., The Effects of Patenting in the AAAS Scientific
Community (2006), http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS_IP_Survey_Report.pdf; see also NAS report,
supra note 13.
108
109

112 For example, the industry successfully lobbied for the Biotechnological Process Patents Act
of 1995, which added 35 U.S.C. § 103(b), which is an amendment to the patent code’s
nonobviousness standard, and provides an exception for biotechnology inventions. See 7 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04(8)(b)(ii)(B) (2004).
113 John P. Walsh et al., Patents, Material Transfers and Access to Research Inputs in
Biomedical Research, at 3 (2005), http://tigger.uic.edu/~jwalsh/WalshChoCohenFinal050922.pdf.
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case involving a patent on a drug, i.e., the patented technology and the firm’s
technology objectives competed.119 Thus, the study identified, at most, one case in
which a research tool patent might have stopped a biomedical research project.
The study clearly suggests that patents are not substantially restricting
biotechnology research, which is consistent with the strong pro-patent position of
biotechnology that we see with respect to patent reform.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY POSITION ON SPECIFIC REFORM
PROPOSALS
In the remainder of this paper, I will consider some of the proposed reforms and
how the changes, if implemented, might impact biotechnology. I will also describe
some specific recent biotechnology patent cases in which the outcome might have
been affected if the reforms were already in place. With respect to some issues, I
suggest that the biotechnology sector might reconsider its position, particularly as
the industry evolves to produce increasingly complex products and derive its revenue
more from product sales and less from investors.

A. Continuation Reform
United States patent law provides that a patent applicant may file one or more
continuation applications.120 If the continuation application meets the requirements
of continuity of disclosure, copendency, cross-referencing, and identity of
inventorship, it will gain the benefit of the filing date of the prior application for
determining patentability and priority.121 A patent applicant whose application has
been “finally rejected” can file a continuation application, which results in effectively
getting another chance to argue in favor of the patentability of his invention to the
PTO. Since there is no limit to the number of continuations that can be filed, it is
virtually impossible for the PTO to ever truly finally reject a patent application.122
Not only does continuation practice enable a patent applicant to keep an
application alive in the PTO indefinitely, but it also allows the applicant to change
and broaden the claims during prosecution, and to file divisional applications.123 The
divisional applications can result in multiple patents, with overlapping claims and
different expiration dates, ultimately issuing out of the filing of a single initial patent
application.124 As a result, a patent applicant can strategically exploit continuation
practice in a variety of ways.
Many argue that the strategic exploitation described above can oftentimes
amount to abuse of the system. For example, Lemley and Moore have identified a
number of pernicious effects of continuation practice as it currently exists, including
119
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the delay and uncertainty it injects into the patent prosecution process, the tendency
of patent practitioners to use the process to “wear down” the patent examiner, and
the problem of “submarine patents.”125 Furthermore, by allowing applicants to
amend and file new and broader claims during the course of patent prosecution, it
has been possible for applicants to introduce claims that cover new developments in
technology that were not envisioned by the patentee at the time the original patent
application was filed.126 Patent applicants also can abuse the process by filing
divisional patent applications incorporating new or revised claims to obtain multiple
patents that all cover essentially the same invention, a tactic referred to as
“evergreening” that has become especially associated with pharmaceutical
inventions.127
In response to these abuses, a number of commentators have proposed
eliminating or strictly curtailing continuation practice.128 The FTC report also
discusses problems with the abuse of continuation practice and suggests that reforms
be considered.129
As originally drafted, H.R. 2795 included a relatively modest proposal to reform
continuation practice, essentially giving the Director of the PTO the authority to
limit continuations in cases where the process was being abused.130 The decision to
act would be solely at the discretion of the Director.131 BIO, joined by WARF,
PhRMA, and Genentech, strongly opposed even this modest proposal for reform,
which presumably contributed to its deletion from the Substitute and Coalition
Print.132
Continuation practice is particularly important to biotechnology for a couple of
reasons. First, the most important and potentially lucrative products being
developed in biotechnology are drugs,133 and pharmaceutical companies have
traditionally employed continuation practice to evergreen their proprietary position,
a process sometimes referred to as “life cycle management.”134
Through
evergreening, many highly profitable drugs are kept “on patent” long past the

See Lemley & Moore, supra note 121, at 74–77, 79–80.
See Lemley & Moore, supra note 121, at 76.
127 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 121, at 81–82.
128 See, e.g., The Patent Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement
of Daniel Ravicher, Executive Director, Public Patent Foundation); Patent Law Revision: Hearing on
H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Lemley Statement] (statement of Mark Lemley, Professor, Stanford Law
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expiration of the initial patent covering the drug itself.135 Surely biotechnology
would like to maintain its ability to take advantage of this strategy.
Second, biotechnology companies are notorious for filing “genomics” patent
applications disclosing hundreds or even thousands of individual gene sequences,
each of which could potentially be a separate patentable invention warranting its
own patent.136 The difficulty for the typical biotechnology company is that at the
time the genetic sequences are discovered, the “inventor” often has no idea which, if
any, of the many sequences might some day turn out to be valuable and hence worthy
of patent protection. Filing individual applications on each sequence would be
prohibitively expensive, so the company files an omnibus “genomics” application
disclosing all of the sequences, thereby establishing a priority date and staking a
claim to all of the sequences.137 Later, if it turns out that one or more of the
sequences are indeed worthy of patent protection, the company can file one or more
divisional applications directed to the particular sequences of interest. It is
continuation practice that makes this approach possible. BIO’s testimony alludes to
this practice, highlighting its importance because the practice allows biotechnology
companies to “obtain adequate protection for the full scope of their inventions [as] the
inventor’s understanding of his or her basic invention increases over time.”138
Biotechnology companies have used (some would say abused) continuation
practice to evergreen protection for some of the fundamental enabling technologies of
biotechnology. For example, in a recent high profile case, Genentech took advantage
of continuation practice to obtain what in effect amounts to a twenty-nine year
patent term covering what the company characterizes as “the ‘fundamental
technology’ required for the artificial synthesis of antibody molecules,” commonly
referred to as the “Cabilly patent.”139 The victims of this particular evergreening
included another large biotechnology company, MedImmune, who decided to
challenge Genentech in the courts and at the PTO.140 MedImmune’s appeal was
rejected by the Federal Circuit for lack of jurisdiction, with the court essentially
finding that as a licensee of the patent, MedImmune lacked standing to challenge the
patent’s validity.141 The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari on
the case to consider whether the Federal Circuit erred in denying standing to
MedImmune.142

135 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 121, at 82 (stating pharmaceutical companies could obtain
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2003.
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In another widely publicized case, the availability of continuation practice and
the ability to evergreen patent exlusivity worked to Genentech’s disadvantage.143
The technology at issue, known as co-transformation, is used in the production of
many of biotechnology’s most profitable protein-based drugs.144 The original patent
application covering the technology was filed in 1980, issued as U.S. Patent No.
4,399,216 in 1983, and expired in 2000.145 Many biotechnology companies, including
Genentech, licensed the technology from the patent owner, Columbia University, and
paid millions of dollars in royalties annually to use the technology in their drug
production processes.146 One might have reasonably assumed that after the patent
expired in 2000 the technology would have become part of the public domain, at
which point it would be freely available without requiring royalty payments.
However, as is so often the case with valuable patents, Columbia pursued a
variety of approaches in an attempt to evergreen its proprietary position.147 In 2002,
much to the chagrin of Genentech and the other companies using the
co-transformation technology, Columbia succeeded in convincing the PTO to grant
another patent, covering what many consider to be essentially the same technology,
for another full seventeen year term.148 These companies unexpectedly faced the
prospect of seventeen more years of royalty payments, and this could not have
occurred had Columbia not been able to exploit the laws of continuation practice.
Genentech and the other affected companies banded together and mounted a
variety of legal challenges to the second patent, which ultimately resulted in
Columbia agreeing not to assert the patent.149 Still, the case illustrates the potential
for mischief inherent in current continuation practice, and the kind of impact such
mischief can have on biotechnology.
In the case of the Columbia and Cabilly patents, Genentech experienced both
aspects of the two-edged sword that is continuation practice. These cases of
evergreened protection on fundamental technologies could have been avoided by
effective continuation reform, which probably would have been of overall benefit to
biotechnology. Still, the ability to evergreen protection of drug products will be
increasingly lucrative for biotechnology, so the industry will likely remain continue
in the belief that, on the whole, continuation practice is good for business.

B. First-Inventor-to-File

143 See generally Recent Development, Columbia, Co-transformation, Commercialization &
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One reform that BIO, PhRMA, and Genentech (but not WARF) support is the
One substantial benefit of the
move to a first-inventor-to-file system.150
first-inventor-to-file system is that it eliminates the need for patent interference
proceeding to determine priority of inventorship.151
By its nature, the biotechnology industry is particularly prone to multiple
entities discovering an invention at about the same time. This arises in large part
from the nature of biotechnology inventions, which often involve the identification of
biological pathways, biomolecules and genetic sequences. Multiple laboratories and
companies are often conducting research in the same area, so not surprisingly they
often make the same discoveries at about the same time. This has resulted in an
inordinately high percentage of patent interferences that involve biotechnology
inventions.152
These patent interferences can have a number of adverse consequences for
biotechnology as a whole. For one thing, they can be quite expensive for the
companies involved. Perhaps more importantly, patent interferences introduce a
great deal of uncertainty and delay into the patenting process, because the process
can take many years to resolve, and until that time no one knows who will ultimately
own the patent. Furthermore, during the course of an interference the claims can
change substantially, and because the proceedings are often secret until a patent
issues, entities that might be affected often have no way of knowing exactly when (or
even if) the patent will ultimately issue, when it will expire, who will own the patent,
and the scope of the claims that might ultimately be allowed.
These concerns with patent interference are analogous to those described above
with respect to continuation practice. In fact, the de facto twenty-nine year patent
term described above was the results of Genentech’s exploitation of both continuation
practice and the interference process.153
Another example where interference practice has imposed a great deal of
uncertainty on biotechnology is the interference relating to Agrobacterium-mediated
transformation, one of the fundamental enabling technologies of agricultural
biotechnology that is used to introduce foreign genes into plants.154 Both Monsanto
and the Max Planck Institute initially filed patent applications on this technology in
1983.155 Later, two other parties also alleged to have been the first to invent the

150 WARF Statement, supra note 69 (testimony of Carl Gulbrandson); BIO Statement, supra
note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess); Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery
Kushan); PhRMA Statement, supra note 72 (testimony of Philip Johnson).
151 Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3; see also CHISUM, supra note 112, § 10.09
(describing current interference practices).
152 Association of Patent Law Firms, Current Patent Interference Statistics, Feb. 3, 2003,
http://www.aplf.org/mailer/interference-02.html (reporting the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences’ finding that the “greatest number of interferences continue to originate from Group
1600 (biotechnology)”).
153 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005). MedImmune has
alleged that Genentech fraudulently abused the interference process in this case. Id.
154 See generally Carl Pray & Anwar Naseem, Intellectual Property Rights on Research ToolsIncentives or Barriers to Innovation? Case Studies of Rice Genomics and Plant Transformation
Technologies, (ICABR International Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology: Ten Years Later,
2005), July 6–10, 2005, http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/conferenze/icabr2005/papers/Naseem.pdf.
155 Id. at 7.
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technology, resulting in a four-way patent interference.156 In October of 2004, after a
twelve-year interference procedure, Monsanto reported that it had finally
prevailed.157 As of the time this article was written no patent has issued, and
because the proceedings are secret the status of the case is not public information.
However, assuming a patent does issue at some point, it will do so with a full
seventeen-year term, i.e., it will be in force more than 40 years after the initial
invention. Because the technology is the primary method by which certain
genetically modified crops are produced, the issuance of the patent could potentially
be catastrophic for some agricultural biotechnology companies, depending upon the
scope of the claims that ultimately issue, the willingness of Monsanto to broadly
license the technology, and to what extent alternative technologies become available.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the Agrobacterium transformation
interference, the ongoing uncertainty associated with the interference has in and of
itself had a detrimental impact on agricultural biotechnology. The threat that a
patent might at some point issue that would prevent the use of Agrobacterium
technology has made it more difficult for some agricultural biotechnology companies
to secure investment funding, and these companies have expended a considerable
amount of energy attempting to design around the technology.158

C. Injunction Reform
Barring exceptional circumstances, such as an imminent risk to public health,
permanent injunctive relief is virtually automatic once a court determines that a
patent has been infringed.159 The computer and software industries have been
particularly adamant in arguing that injunctions should not be automatic.160
Instead, they argue that in some cases equity requires that only money damages be
assessed, particularly when the patentee is a “non-manufacturing entity” (“NME”)
that does not produce or market the patented technology but merely seeks to extract
royalty payments from companies that do. NMEs are sometimes referred to
pejoratively as “patent trolls.”161
One of the reforms included in H.R. 2795 as originally filed would have
weakened the presumption in favor of injunction by requiring a court to consider the
fairness of an injunction in light of all the facts and the relevant interests of the
parties.162 It would have also permitted a court to stay an injunction pending appeal
upon an affirmative showing that the stay would not result in irreparable harm to
156
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159 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74
U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2005) (No. 05-103) (asking parties to brief and argue on “when it is
appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent infringer”).
160 FTC REPORT, supra note 10, ch. 3, pt. 4, at 38.
161 Lemley Statement, supra note 128 (testimony of Mark Lemley) (explaining that “patent
trolls” use the patent system to squeeze money out of those who develop products).
162 Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795 § 8.
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the patent owner.163 In their testimony, BIO, Genentech, WARF, and PhRMA
adamantly opposed injunction reform. Consequently, injunction reform was not
included in the Substitute or Coalition Print.
The opposing positions of BIO and PhRMA on one hand and the information
sector on the other have often been attributed to the very different characteristics of
the industries.164 Software programs and semiconductor chips comprise thousands of
individual components, each of which can be subject to an individual patent.165
Furthermore, ownership of these component patents is typically distributed among
multiple parties, many of whom are solely in the business of licensing the patent as
opposed to actually making a product, i.e., NMEs.166 This leads to a problem of
hold-up, where the holder of a patent that covers only a small fraction of a
commercial product leverages unjustifiably high royalty payments out of the
manufacturer by enjoining sales of the entire product.167 This scenario is particularly
problematic because, in many cases, the manufacturer is locked into the product
design. For example, once a software application or semiconductor chip has been
designed, manufactured, and introduced into the market, it can be extremely
expensive for the manufacturer to re-engineer the product to avoid an allegedly
infringed patent, even though the patent might only cover a small fraction of the
entire product.168 It is the threat of permanent injunction that provides the patentee
with leverage to demand an inordinately high royalty relative to the actual value the
technology brings to the product. Essentially, the manufacturer is paying not for the
technology per se, but to avoid the expense of having to switch technologies
midstream.169
The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, on the other hand, have been
characterized as having much simpler products that are typically only covered by a
single or relatively few patents, e.g., drugs.170 For this reason, the hold-up
phenomenon tends to be much less of a problem, or so the conventional thinking goes.
At the same time, injunctions are thought to be important for the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries because they can be used to stop the sales of infringing
generic products; the argument being that money damages would not be a sufficient
remedy for such infringement.171 In general, the availability of injunctive relief
greatly increases the power of a patent, so any weakening of the strong presumption
in favor of injunctions will necessarily tend to weaken the rights of patent owners,
something that biotechnology generally opposes.

Id.
Lemley Statement, supra note 128 (testimony of Mark Lemley).
165 Id.
166 See id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. For example, in his congressional testimony Prof. Mark Lemley referenced an example
163
164

where a patent owner “charges a 0.75% royalty for patents that don’t cover industry standards, and
3.75% for patents that do cover industry standards.” Id. He asserts that the five-fold difference in
royalty rates represents the difference in royalty rates for technology that is “locked in” versus the
value of the technology itself. Id.
170 Id.
171

Id.
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The generalization that biotechnology is characterized by simple, unitary
inventions is probably an oversimplification. Biotechnology products are becoming
increasingly complex, the result of the synthesis of multiple input technologies, each
of which is potentially covered by one or more patents. This trend is certain to
continue. As biotechnology products become more complex, they will increasingly
become vulnerable to the threat of injunctive hold-up, and at some point
biotechnology might need to reevaluate its support for virtually automatic permanent
injunctions in all cases of patent infringement.
For example, consider agricultural biotechnology, which generally involves
introducing one or more genetic changes into a crop plant, resulting in desirable new
crop traits.172 The process is quite involved, and relies upon the use of a variety of
different enabling technologies, many of which are covered by patents.173 In one
highly publicized case study, scientists used biotechnology to create “golden rice,” a
form of rice genetically modified to produce elevated levels of vitamin A.174 It was
envisioned that golden rice could be grown in developing countries and serve as an
inexpensive and accessible source of this vital nutrient for impoverished people
suffering from vitamin A deficiency.175 However, an initial freedom-to-operate
analysis determined that the development of the product was covered by at least
seventy different patents, and licensing the required intellectual property was viewed
as a major obstacle to the project.176 In the end, the developers of golden rice
convinced patent owners to freely license the necessary technologies, who probably
agreed because golden rice was being developed primarily for humanitarian purposes
and was not thought to be viable as a commercial product.177 However, one can well
imagine that when a biotechnology company is attempting to develop a commercially
viable recombinant crop product, this complex patent landscape could prove a
formidable barrier to development. The potential for a single patent holder to obtain
a permanent injunction barring the sale of the entire product surely compounds the
problem. Once the product is on the market, the producer is at least as locked into
the technology as the semiconductor chip manufacturer, and just as vulnerable to
hold-up.
Golden rice is a fairly simple recombinant product, involving the introduction of
a single gene conferring a single trait, and is typical of the first wave of agricultural
biotechnology.178 However, agricultural technology continues to move towards “trait
stacking,” i.e., the introduction of multiple genetically modified traits into a single
172 Cliff D. Weston, Chilling the Corn: Agricultural Biotechnology in the Face of U.S. Patent
Law and the Cartagena Protocol, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 377, 384 (2000).
173 Id.
174 See Xudong Ye et al., Engineering the Provitamin A (Beta-Carotene) Biosynthetic Pathway
into (Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm, 287 SCI. 303 (2000) (discussing the case study on golden

rice).

175

Id. at 303.

The ETC group, formerly RAFI–the Rural Advancement Foundation International, Golden
Rice and Trojan Reps: A Case Study in the Public Sector’s Mismanagement of Intellectual Property,
Issue 66 (2000), http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/com_goldenrice.pdf.
176

177

Id.

Meeting Minutes of Product Characterization, Human Health Risk, Ecological Risk, And
Insect Resistance Management For Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Cotton Products, FIFRA Scientific
Advisory Panel, at 23 (June 8–10, 2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2004/june/final1a.pdf.
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product.179 For example, a plant might contain recombinant genes conferring “input
traits,” such as tolerance to drought, tolerance to high soil salinity, resistance to one
or more herbicides, and resistance to a variety of pests, as well as “output traits”
aimed at improving the taste, nutrition, and durability of the final product.180 The
needs of individual growers will vary (for example, by geographical region), and
ultimately the variety of different trait stacking combinations will be immense.
Given that each of the individual traits will likely be covered by multiple patents
protecting a variety of genetic starting materials and enabling technologies, the
patent landscape will begin to look much like the one facing semiconductor chip
manufacturers. As this occurs, the problems of hold-up and the threat of injunction
characteristic of the computer industry will increasingly become a problem for
biotechnology.
In fact, some would say that we are already facing this situation. It has been
reported that obtaining freedom to operate has become a major obstacle in the
development of genetically modified crops.181
To address this situation, an
organization called CAMBIA has embarked upon a mission to develop alternatives to
patented technology that would be freely available to those developing agricultural
biotechnology products, particularly those products aimed at developing countries.182
This program would alleviate the bottleneck caused by the multitude of patents that
encumber so much of the enabling technology.183
As another illustration of the increasing complexity of biotechnology products,
consider the DNA microarray, often referred to as a hybridization array or DNA
chip.184 Microarrays consist of small DNA fragments, called probes, physically
attached to a solid surface such as glass, plastic, or silicon chip to form an array.185
The precise location of each distinct probe is called a feature, and thousands, or even
millions of different features can be contained in a single microarray.186 DNA
microarrays have proven extremely useful in a variety of contexts, including gene
discovery, basic biomedical research, disease diagnosis, drug discovery
(pharmacogenomics), and toxicological research (toxicogenomics).187 The leading
179 Review of Agricultural Biotechnology: Before the Subcomm. on Conservation, Credit, Rural
Development, and Research of the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Fred
available
at
Yoder,
Chairman,
National
Corn
Growers
Association),

http://www.ncga.com/biotechnology/pdfs/YoderHouseAgSubcommitteeTestimony06_2004.pdf.
180
181

Id.
See Press Release, Rural Advancement Found. Int'l, Monsanto's "Submarine Patent"

Torpedoes Ag Biotech: Monsanto & Syngenta Monopolize Key Gene Marker Technologies (Apr. 26,
2001), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/news_monsantosub.pdf (expressing concern
over the affect of the monopolization of antibiotic resistance gene markers in agricultural
biotechnology companies’ freedom to operate).
182 Cambia, Cambia’s Mission and Ethos, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/590.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2006).
183
184

See id.
See generally Leming Shi, DNA Microarray (Genome Chip), http://www.gene-chips.com

(last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (describing the basic principles and uses of DNA microarray technology).
185 William M Freeman et al., Fundamentals of DNA Hybridization Arrays for Gene
Expression Analysis, 29 BIOTECHNIQUES 1042, 1046 (2000), available at
http://photoscience.la.asu.edu/photosyn/courses/MCB_576/Freeman_et_al_arrays.pdf.
186
Affymetrix, Technology: The Industry Standard in Quality and Excellence,
http://www.affymetrix.com/technology/index.affx (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
187 See Shi, supra note 184.
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company associated with the development and marketing of DNA microarrays is
Affymetrix, Inc.188
DNA microarrays can contain a huge number of different genetic sequences in a
single product, each of the sequences representing a different gene or genetic
polymorphism.189 Since genetic sequences and polymorphisms are often patented, a
single DNA microarray might infringe on a host of individual patents.190 In view of
the non-centralized nature of gene discovery research, those patents will likely be
owned by a large number of different entities.191 In terms of complexity, the DNA
microarray more closely resembles the semiconductor chip, with its thousands of
patented components, than the unitary drug products that are traditionally
associated with biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry. One would predict
that such a technology would create the same sort of hold-up concerns described
above in connection with computer and software products.
As a hypothetical, consider a DNA microarray containing 1000 different DNA
features corresponding to 1000 different human genes, some of which are covered by
patents. The owner of a patent covering one of the features could sue the microarray
manufacturer for infringement, but if the only available relief is money damages, the
recovery would likely be minimal. Specifically, if the patent owner is not competing
in the microarray market, the amount of damages would be based on a “reasonable
royalty,” and the reasonable royalty for a patent covering a component that
constitutes only a small fraction of the total invention should be minimal. However,
with the leverage of injunctive relief, the patentee would be able to demand an
inordinately high settlement by threatening to enjoin sales of the entire array.192
This is exactly the problem complained of by the information technology sector, but
here we see an example where it applies equally to biotechnology.
Recognizing this problem, Affymetrix has separated itself from many
biotechnology companies by actively lobbying for limitations on the patent system,
particularly with respect to the patenting of genes and other genetic information.193
For example, Affymetrix has filed amicus briefs arguing for restrictions on the
patentability of genetic information in two recent high profile patent cases.194 It has
188 Signature Genomic Libraries, LLC and Affymetrix, Inc. Sign License Agreement,
FORBES.COM: BUSINESSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/businesswire/feeds/businesswire/2006/02/14businesswire20060214006128rl.h
tml (asserting that Affymetrix has set the standard in microarray technology).
189 See Luca Falciola, Rewarding True Innovation: Experimental Use Exemption and the
Trends in Gene Patenting, 1 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 200, 201–202 (2000).
190 See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 985, 1023 (2005).
191 Falciola, supra note 189.
192 Lorelei Perez Westin, Note and Comment, Genetic Patents: Gatekeeper to the Promised
Cures, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 271, 272 (2002) (suggesting that patentees can exclude others from
using the invention and “control [the] licensing fee for use of the patented invention, such that the
fee would be non-proportional to the value of the end product”).
193 Ronald Bailey, BIO 2003: Reporter’s Notebook, REASON ONLINE, June 25, 2003,
http://www.reason.com/rb/rb062503.shtml (reporting that “Affymetrix is advocating a controversial
shift away from the current system, in which entities like individual genes and proteins can be
patented”).
194 See Brief for Amicus Curiae Affymetrix, Inc. in Support of Appellee, In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365
(Fed.
Cir.
2005)
(No.
04-1465),
available
at
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also been active in promoting the idea of pooling gene sequence patents to facilitate
freedom-to-operate for companies commercializing genetic technology.195
Looking forward, the products of biotechnology will generally become more
complex. One development that will be driving this trend is the movement toward
“personalized medicine.” Personalized medicine has been defined as “the use of new
methods of molecular analysis to better manage a patient's disease or predisposition
towards a disease.”196 It primarily involves the use of molecular diagnostic
technologies, such as DNA microarrays, to tailor a personalized therapeutic regime
based on the particular needs of an individual patient as determined by the
particular genetic characteristics of that individual.197
Increasingly, the products of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
will not simply be drugs, but drugs packaged with complex molecular diagnostic and
pharmacogenomic testing routines that will serve to tailor treatment to the needs of
the individual patients, i.e., multiple component products.198 Importantly, the
diagnostic tools and reagents used to implement the promise of personalized
medicine will tend to be subject to a host of widely dispersed patent rights. This
movement toward more complex products, subject to multiple patent claims, will
result in injunctive hold-up becoming much more of a concern for biotechnology, and
could modify the industries current strong support for mandatory permanent
injunctions.

D. Subjective Elements of Patent Law
One of the key reforms proposed by the National Academies was the elimination,
or at least limitation, of what it referred to as “subjective elements of patent
litigation,” including the best mode requirement and the inequitable conduct
defense.199 The best mode requirement requires disclosure in the patent specification
of the best mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out the patented
invention.200 Inequitable conduct involves a breach of the duty of candor and good
faith that all patent applicants owe to the PTO; the breach typically involves a
material misrepresentation or a failure to disclose information known to be relevant
to the patentability of a claimed invention.201 A finding of inequitable conduct in
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/affymetrix_amicus_brief.pdf; Brief for Amici Curiae
Affymetrix, Inc. & John H. Barton in Support of Petitioner, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
available
at
Labs.,
Inc.,
No.
04-607
(U.S.
Dec.
23,
2005),
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/AffymetrixAmicus.pdf.
195 Thomas Malone, Senior Intellectual Property Counsel, Affymetrix, Inc., Address at the
Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Feb. 19, 2006).
196 Personalized Medicine Coalition, Comments on SACGHS Draft Report “Coverage and
Reimbursement
of
Genetic
Test
and
Services”
(May
11,
2005),
http://www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/sciencepolicy/public-policy_sacghs-position.php.
197
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See id.
See Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology Tools in Research and

Development, http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/biotechtools.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2006)
(describing a new generation of targeted products and genetically tailored therapeutics).
199 NAS Report, supra note 13, at 182
200 CHISUM, supra note 112, § 7.05.
201 CHISUM, supra note 112, § 19.03.
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connection with procurement of a patent will render the entire patent
unenforceable.202
These doctrines are referred to as subjective because they require an inquiry
into a person’s state of mind.203 For example, an inventor is not required to disclose
what might objectively be the best mode of practicing an invention, but what the
inventor believes to be the best mode. Failure to disclose material information to the
PTO is only inequitable conduct if the inventor (or patent attorney) is aware of the
information and believes it to be material.204 Because the state of mind of inventors
and patent attorneys is typically not ascertainable from the patent or any other
publicly accessible source, violation is usually only identified during litigation, when
pre-trial discovery allows the defendant access to the files and records of the
patentee.205 For this reason, Professor Lemley has referred to the subjective
elements of patent law as “gotchas”: deficiencies in the patent that become apparent
only during litigation, and can be devastating to a patent owner when a
presumptively valid patent is found to be invalid or unenforceable based upon a
culpable state of mind.206
There are a number of costs associated with these subjective elements of U.S.
patent law.207 First, these elements can substantially add to the expense and burden
of pre-trial discovery as the parties go to great lengths to uncover the smoking gun
tending to show proof of a culpable state of mind.208 Perhaps more importantly, these
elements create substantial uncertainty with respect to the validity and
enforceability of any issued patent.
Unlike more objective patentability
requirements, such as novelty, nonobviousness and enablement, this uncertainty
normally cannot be ameliorated by an interested third party’s “due diligence”
inquiry. With respect to the objective patentability requirements, an interested third
party can review the patent specification, the file history, and the state of the art at
the time of the invention, all of which are public information, to make a reasonable
assessment as to the validity and scope of an issued patent. In contrast, it will
generally be impossible for a third party to effectively assess the state of mind of
inventors and the patent attorneys that were involved with procuring a patent, and
thus extremely difficult to assess the likelihood that a culpable state of mind might
be uncovered during pre-trial discovery that would render the patent invalid or
unenforceable.209
To the extent patents are particularly critical to the biotechnology industry and
the decision to invest in biotechnology, this uncertainty will disproportionately

CHISUM, supra note 112, § 19.03.
NAS Report, supra note 13, at 117.
204 NAS Report, supra note 13, at 121.
205 NAS Report, supra note 13, at 121.
202
203

206 Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Mark A.
available
at
Lemley,
Professor,
Stanford
Law
School),

http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/senateoversight/061405/prepared/lemley.
pdf.
207 These subjective elements are unique to U.S. patent law.
208 NAS Report, supra note 13, at 7.
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impact biotechnology.210 Early-stage biotechnology companies are often based on a
single core technology that has the potential to lead to products, and investment
financing is imperative.211 A proprietary position with respect to the core technology,
secured by one or more patents, is generally a prerequisite for venture funding.212
Given the possibility that the key patent might be found invalid or unenforceable for
violation of one of the subjective requirements of patentability, a rational investor
will discount the value of the patent, which will negatively impact the ability of the
company to secure the required funding.213 Because the state of mind of inventors
and patent attorneys is difficult, if not impossible, to effectively ascertain, investors
will not be able to adequately address this fear even by conducting a thorough due
diligence inquiry.
Oftentimes, a patented technology is not commercially developed by the
inventor, but rather is licensed to another company for development and
marketing.214 This situation is characteristic of technology invented in university
laboratories, but also occurs when biotechnology companies invent technology and
license it to larger biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies.215 A competent
licensee of new technology will conduct a due diligence inquiry in order to assess the
strength of the patent, but will normally not be able to rule out the possibility of best
mode or inequitable conduct “skeletons in the closet.” Once again, this uncertainty
should cause a rational licensee to discount the value of the patent, to the ultimate
detriment of the licensor. Patent law reforms eliminating or restricting the
subjective elements of patent would reduce this uncertainty, to the benefit of
biotechnology investors, licensors, and licensees alike.
Tressa James, a commentator on the subject, has argued that biotechnology
inventions are uniquely vulnerable to invalidation under the best mode requirement
because the subjective nature of the inquiry affords judges substantial discretion to

210 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1676–1677 (2003) (explaining that biotechnology is a particularly risky and time consuming field,
such that any additional uncertainty would discourage the incentive to engage in further
innovation).

211 Patent Reform Act of 2005: Hearing on an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R.
2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of Robert B. Chess, Executive Chairman, Nektar
Therapeutics, on Behalf of the Biotechnology Industry Organization), available at

http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/houseoversight/091505/prepared/chess.pd
f.
212
213
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See Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the Ends Justify the Means?, 7 COMP. L. REV. &

TECH. J. 255, 261 (2003) (suggesting that if the secure rights of patent protection were not available
to biotechnology companies, investors would be less attracted to such companies because the
prospect of earning large profits is less certain).
214 See Charles Allen Black, The Cure for Deadly Patent Practices: Preventing Technology
Supression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 397, 402 (2004).
“[P]atents motivate inventors to sell or license the invention to generate the monopolistic profits.”

Id.

215 See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(describing the exclusive licensing of patents relating to PCR technology from a small biotechnology
company to a major pharmaceutical company).
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invalidate patents that they might actually find offensive for policy reasons.216 For
example, a judge who believes that genes should not be patentable might use the best
mode requirement as a pretense to invalidate a genomic patent.217 James cites a
number of cases where the validity of biotechnology patents has been challenged
under the best mode requirement.218 However, the courts never actually invalidated
the patent in any of the decisions. Recently, Allison and Lemley surveyed every
written, final validity decision by both the district courts and the Federal Circuit
reported in the United States Patent Quarterly during the period extending from
early 1989 through 1996.219 The study encompassed 299 patents litigated in 230
different cases.220 They reported that only one pharmaceutical patent, and not a
single biotechnology patent, had been invalidated for failure to comply with the best
mode requirement.221
James did cite one case, Regents of the University of California v. Oncor, Inc.,
where a court found that a defendant had at least raised a justiciable issue of fact as
to whether the inventor of a biotechnology invention had complied with the best
mode requirement.222 In Oncor, the claimed invention was a molecular biology
procedure that involved the use of blocking DNA probes.223 The defendant alleged
that the inventor knew that the best mode of practicing the invention involved
including an RNase in the procedure, but that the specification failed to mention the
use of RNase.224 As evidence, the defendant pointed to grant applications and
notebooks of the inventor (obtained during pre-trial discovery) that recommended the
use of RNase in the procedure; this recommendation apparently did not end up in the
patent specification.225
Oncor exemplifies the uncertain position third parties face when considering
whether to license or invest in a patent. In order to discover the best mode problems
with the patent, an analyst would have had to review all of the laboratory notebooks
and grant applications for all of the inventors listed on the patent. For the most part,
these documents are not publicly available, and reside in the files of the individual
inventors. A third party lacking the benefit of discovery would essentially never be
able to gain access to them. This problem is compounded in biotechnology, where
many of the patents do not have a single inventor, but a large number of inventors.226
Even though best mode violations have not yet resulted in many biotechnology
patents being found invalid, the potential for such findings exist, and the subjective
216 Tressa Jennifer James, Comment, Implications of the Best Mode Requirement on Patents
Involving Biotechnology, 2 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 96, 101 (2002).
217 See id. at 136–37 (asserting that variations in the standard for resolving best mode cases

seem to indicate that the decisions are based on a high degree of subjectivity).
218 See id. at 117–33.
219 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187 (1998).
220
221

Id.
Id. at 221.

222 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Oncor, Inc., No. C-95-3084, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15068, at
*32 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1997).
223 Id. at *4.
224 Id. at *33.
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See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 2002/0045170 (filed Apr. 18, 2002) (genomics patent

application listing eight individual inventors).
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nature of the inquiry will generally render it difficult, if not impossible, for a
potential investor or licensee to identify the problem by reasonable due diligence.
The inequitable conduct defense, on the other hand, actually has had a major
impact in biotechnology patent litigation. In some high profile cases, valuable
patents have been held to be unenforceable,227 and even in cases where the
enforceability of the patent is ultimately upheld, 228 these challenges add to the
expense of litigation. Perhaps more importantly, these challenges lead to significant
uncertainty with respect to patent valuation.
A good example of the problems this poses for biotechnology can be seen in
Hoffman LaRoche v. Promega.229 The case involved the patent covering Taq
polymerase, a thermostable DNA polymerase used in performing Polymerase Chain
Reaction (“PCR”), a groundbreaking invention that earned the inventor a Nobel prize
and has fundamentally transformed medicine and science.230 PCR technology,
including the Taq polymerase, was developed in the early days of biotechnology by
Cetus, a small biotechnology start-up company.231 Cetus, which eventually merged
with Chiron, exclusively licensed the PCR technology to Hoffman-LaRoche (“Roche”),
a large, multinational pharmaceutical company.232 Unfortunately for Roche, Cetus
apparently engaged in some misconduct during the prosecution of the Taq
polymerase patent that ultimately resulted in the patent being found unenforceable
for inequitable conduct.233 In particular, the Federal Circuit found that some Cetus
inventors or attorneys had intentionally made material misrepresentations to the
PTO during the prosecution of the patent.234 Specifically, one of the examples in the
patent specification described a procedure for purifying Taq polymerase in the past
tense, and according to well-established convention, past tense is only used in patent
specifications to describe experiments that have actually been performed.235
However, at trial it was shown that the procedure had actually not been performed
as described in the example.236 Instead, it was a prophetic example based on a
combination of two separate experiments that had been performed.237 On remand,
the trial court entered final judgment finding the patent to be unenforceable for
inequitable conduct, effectively killing the patent.238 The result was devastating for
Roche, who not only had to accept the death of its exclusive license, but also suit
227 See, e.g., Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
228 See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 128 Fed. Appx. 767 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 391 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Bayer
Bioscience N.V., 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
229 Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
230 Smithsonian Institution Archives, The History of PCR,
http://www.si.edu/archives/ihd/videocatalog/9577.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
231 Roche Molecular Diagnostics, Chronology of PCR Technology, http://www.rochediagnostics.com/ba_rmd/pcr_evolution.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
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under the antitrust laws for licensing a patent obtained by fraud.239 The subjective
nature of the inquiry makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a company like Roche to
identify these “gotchas” prior to licensing the technology, and this uncertainty must
surely affect the confidence potential investors and licensees have in the patents
covering biotechnology.

E. Post-Grant Oppositions
The BIO and PhRMA testimonies both express strong opposition to secondwindow post grant-opposition proceedings.
BIO primarily argued that such
proceedings would create too much uncertainty with respect to issued patents since
the opportunity to challenge would extend beyond the initial nine-month firstwindow opposition, and investors would see this extension as casting a cloud of
uncertainty around any issued patents.240 Of course, a party charged with
infringement can always challenge patent validity during litigation, but the
availability of second-window oppositions make patent validity challenges easier and
less expensive. Therefore the opportunity for second-window oppositions likely would
embolden alleged infringers to more often challenge patent validity rather than
merely settling in order to avoid the huge costs associated with full-blown patent
litigation. Thus, the general effect would be to weaken the practical ability of
patentees to enforce their patents.
As pointed out by Mark Lemley in his Senate testimony, one of the primary
beneficiaries of second-window opposition would likely be generic drug
manufacturers, who could use the process to easily challenge the validity of drug
patents.241 Thus, it is not surprising that developers of innovative new drugs hoping
to delay generic competition would object to this provision.
Although BIO and PhRMA were both silent on the issue, Genentech did voice
support of first-window opposition proceeding. Many of the fundamental enabling
technologies that companies, like Genentech, use in conducting research and
development have been the subject of broad patents, and Genentech has on a number
of occasions been forced to defend itself against charges of patent infringement.242
Currently, inter partes and ex partes patent reexamination is available to
challenge a patent’s validity. However, reexamination cannot be used to challenge a
patent for non-compliance with sections 101 and 112 of the patent statute, which are
the basis for the utility, enablement, and written description requirements.243 As
pointed out by Genentech in its congressional testimony, violations of these
requirements are the most commonly encountered deficiencies in biotechnology
patents.244 The proposed first-window post-grant opposition procedure would allow a
patent to be challenged on most grounds relating to patentability, including failure to
239 Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., No. 04-01649, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Dec.
available
at
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/2005/Kennedy/2004-CV1,
2005),
1649~10:25:48~12-1-2005-a.pdf.
240 BIO Statement, supra note 56 (testimony of Robert Chess).
241 Lemley Statement, supra note 128 (testimony of Mark Lemley).
242 See, e.g., supra Part IV.A; Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
243 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2000).
244 Genentech Statement, supra note 64 (testimony of Jeffery Kushan).
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satisfy sections 101 and 112, and thus could be a particularly useful tool for
biotechnology companies seeking to nip an overly broad or otherwise defective
biotechnology patent in the bud.245
V. CONCLUSION
Although H.R. 2795 has been side-tracked for the time being, patent reform will
no doubt be the subject of legislative attention in the not too distant future. The
proposed changes could significantly impact the biotechnology industry both
positively and negatively. Currently, biotechnology’s agenda for patent reform
appears to be shaped primarily by a perception that strong patent rights are critical
to secure the investment funding required to support early-stage biotechnology
companies engaged in expensive research and development. However, as the
industry evolves to comprise more companies generating substantial revenues from
product sales and as those products become more complex, appropriate restraints on
patent procurement and enforcement will likely become increasingly important to
biotechnology. When the concerns of biotechnology become more aligned with those
of other industries, particularly those in the information technology sector,
biotechnology firms might take a more moderate view of patent reform and choose to
support some restrictions that would serve to limit the rights of patent applicants
and patent owners.

245

Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005).

